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Summary and Keywords
The Cold War in Latin America had marked consequences for the region’s political and
economic evolution. From the origins of US fears of Latin American Communism in the
early 20th century to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, regional actors
played central roles in the drama. Seeking to maximize economic benefit while maintain
ing independence with regard to foreign policy, Latin Americans employed an eclectic
combination of liberal and anti-imperialist discourses, balancing frequent calls for antiCommunist hemispheric unity with periodic diplomatic entreaties to the Soviet bloc and
the nonaligned Third World. Meanwhile, US Cold War policies toward the region ranged
from progressive developmentalism to outright military invasions, and from psychological
warfare to covert paramilitary action. Above all, the United States sought to shore up its
allies and maintain the Western Hemisphere as a united front against extra-hemispheric
ideologies and influence. The Cold War was a bloody, violent period for Latin America, but
it was also one marked by heady idealism, courageous political action, and fresh narra
tives about Latin America’s role in the world, all of which continue to inform regional pol
itics to this day.
Keywords: United States, Cold War, Latin America, Communism, nationalism, Third World, development, dictator
ship, Cuba, counterinsurgency

Origins
The Cold War in Latin America, defined either as more than a century of conflict between
capitalism and socialist alternatives, or as a forty-year period of US-Soviet competition,
had marked consequences for the region’s political and economic evolution. Acknowledg
ing that local and regional actors played central roles in the drama, this article analyzes
how the United States employed a range of foreign policy options to contain socialist and
anti-imperialist tendencies in Latin America. It meanwhile emphasizes not only on wellknown protagonists such as Guatemala’s Jacobo Arbenz, Cuba’s Fidel Castro, and Chile’s
Salvador Allende but also on the region’s broader 20th-century evolution as the Cold War
shaped (and was shaped by) countries as diverse as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, the Domini
can Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama. Either approach to the Cold War (as an
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ideological conflict or as a historical period) requires consideration of the Cold War’s evo
lution from its origins in the years following Russia’s Bolshevik (Communist) Revolution
in 1917 through World War II, culminating in the formal declarations of US-Soviet ideo
logical hostility in the late 1940s. This prehistory of Latin America’s Cold War was
marked by eclectic diplomacy and a short-lived anti-fascist Popular Front that brought
US-led capitalist forces together with Communist movements before and during World
War II.
During the 1910s and 1920s, the government in Washington attempted to prevent the
emergence of socialist influence in Latin America through a host of military, psychologi
cal, cultural, and economic initiatives designed to encourage the growth of free markets
and varying forms of guided democracy. This ideological framework took the form of US
military involvement in Cuba (1898), Panama and Colombia (1903), Nicaragua (1912),
Mexico (1914), Haiti (1915), and the Dominican Republic (1916), all of which predated
Russia’s 1917 revolution. Liberal internationalism also came to define the response by
President Woodrow Wilson (1913–1921) to the emergence of a declared Communist state
in Europe. Citing the perception of growing Latin American interest in Marxism after
1917, Wilson continued to increase Washington’s financial commitment to its colonial oc
cupations in the Caribbean, with the goal of demonstrating that the United States pre
ferred democratic reform (to “teach the South American republics to elect good men”) to
conservative counterrevolution.1 Prompted by Wilson’s enunciation of progressive princi
ples to achieve peace in World War I, nonstate actors such as the American Federation of
Labor also worked closely with the US government to intervene in Mexico and further
south to encourage nonsocialist forms of trade unionism. Foreshadowing the liberal inter
nationalism that would mark Washington’s interventionism during the subsequent
decades of the Cold War, Wilson’s southward gaze took place within the context of rapidly
expanding US private investment in Latin America, as North American banks and corpo
rations stepped in to replace declining European investment during the upheavals of the
Great War.
A subsequent series of business-friendly Republican administrations somewhat tempered
Wilson’s robust and moralistic approach to international affairs. Fueled by the emergence
of isolationist sentiment in the interwar United States, and placing emphasis on winding
down Washington’s costly occupations in the Caribbean, Presidents Warren Harding
(1921–1923), Calvin Coolidge (1923–1929), and Herbert Hoover (1929–1933) all down
played ideological motivations in US foreign policy. Preferring instead to carry out a nar
rowly conceived return to early 1900s “dollar diplomacy,” the 1920s Republicans aimed to
conduct foreign relations, particularly in Latin America, through what they considered to
be the more dignified and respectful trappings of business transactions. Never fully com
mitted to the principles of self-determination or democratization, the Republican inter
lude witnessed an end to US military rule only in the Dominican Republic, while
Washington’s bloody occupations persisted in Haiti and Nicaragua. Fear of Communism
were particularly strong in the latter country, where Washington feverishly attempted to
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contain an uprising by renegade Liberal guerrilla leader Augusto Sandino, who was even
tually captured and executed in 1934.
The 1929 Great Depression added impetus to Republican efforts to reduce Washington’s
direct involvement in Latin America, while simultaneously sapping the political will and
resources needed to sustain indirect US patronage in the region. This led to the emer
gence of a host of nationalist reactions, in South America especially, which fueled internal
pressures for nationalizing foreign properties and led to a surge in trade unionism. Influ
enced in part by the rise of fascist governments in Europe, Latin America’s first experi
ence with radical nationalism provoked great fear among US politicians and business in
terests, quickly overshadowing Washington’s previous perceptions of a mild Communist
threat. Seeking to lessen the appeal of anti-US nationalism in the region, President
Franklin Roosevelt (1933–1945) announced the Good Neighbor Policy shortly after his in
auguration, thus going further than his predecessors in forswearing direct US interven
tion in Latin America. Reflecting a global shift toward anti-fascist Popular Front politics,
which united liberal capitalists and radical leftists in the 1930s and early 1940s,
Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy motivated decisions to finally end Washington’s occupa
tions in the Caribbean, abrogate the colonial Platt Amendment restricting Cuba’s sover
eignty, and eventually pressure US investors to accede to expropriations of oil properties
in Bolivia (1936) and Mexico (1938). Perhaps the most wide-ranging manifestations of the
Good Neighbor Policy took place in the areas of development programs and psychological
operations, including a progressive effort to support Mexico’s 1930s land reform, fol
lowed by the 1940 launch of a hemispheric cultural support network for writers, artists,
and trade unionists overseen by Nelson Rockefeller’s State Department Office of the Co
ordinator of Inter-American Affairs.
The US entry into World War II catalyzed a further expansion of Washington’s involve
ment in Latin America, which still hewed closely to anti-fascist Popular Front politics and
therefore forged ever stronger alliances between liberal capitalists and the Latin Ameri
can Left. Some have referred to this period as the region’s Democratic Spring, during
which the influence of Communist parties and radical trade unionists grew, sometimes
leading to their entrance into governing coalitions. This was particularly the case in pro
gressive countries such as Brazil and Mexico, but even occurred in conservative regimes
such as Cuba under Fulgencio Batista. Perhaps no country better symbolized the impact
of anti-fascism than Guatemala, whose 1944 revolution brought to power a series of pro
gressive governments that legalized and increasingly collaborated with organized labor
and the Communist Party.
To varying degrees, Latin America’s Popular Front dissipated along with rising postwar
tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, and by the end of the decade
there were few places in the region where Communists could still operate openly. In most
cases, conservative reaction in the late 1940s can be mapped neatly alongside the mutual
recriminations issued during these years by President Harry Truman (1945–1953) and
Soviet leader Joseph Stalin (1924–1953). For many Latin American political elites, this po
larization of international politics helped justify the forging of a hemispheric mutual de
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fense pact subsequently ratified by the creation of the Organization of American States
(OAS) in 1948.
The collapse of the wartime Popular Front was apparent not only in the resurgence of oli
garchy in the Caribbean but also in the gains achieved by radical nationalist movements
in the Southern Cone of South America. Taking advantage of a weakening alliance be
tween capitalists and leftists, nationalists won power in Argentina (1946) and Bolivia
(1952), in both cases rushing to distance themselves from their fascist roots. As for Wash
ington, threat perceptions had shifted once again, leading to a more tolerant attitude to
ward nationalism, in roughly equal proportion to rising US concerns about the postwar
Left. By the mid-1950s, however, US allies in both countries had succeeded in tempering
the Argentine and Bolivian nationalist experiences, suggesting that Washington could
perhaps have its liberal capitalist cake and eat it, too. Seemingly secure from both radical
nationalism and orthodox leftism, US policymakers now had only to concentrate on one
troublesome exception: revolutionary Guatemala.

Intensification
By the time the Republican Party took back the White House in 1953 after twenty years of
Democratic rule, the United States was enmeshed in a worldwide conflict with Commu
nism, including a bloody and costly war with Chinese military forces on the Korean Penin
sula. Seeking to lower the cost of containing the Soviet Union and its growing network of
global allies, incoming president Dwight Eisenhower (1953–1961) launched what has be
come known as the “New Look,” which included a reduction in military spending, an in
creased reliance on nuclear brinksmanship to influence Soviet and Chinese behavior, and
a renewed emphasis on covert action as a tool of the Cold War. Since the bipolar conflict
remained distant from the supposedly secure regions south of the Río Grande, only the
third component of the New Look, covert action, held much importance for Latin Ameri
ca. And until the advent of the Cuban revolution in 1959, Guatemala held the distinction
of being the sole target of major intervention in the hemisphere by the Central Intelli
gence Agency (CIA).
In August 1953 Eisenhower ordered the CIA to reactivate plans for a coup in Guatemala
that had been scuttled by State Department meddling in the last months of the Truman
administration. His CIA had just successfully directed a coup d’état against Iran’s nation
alist government, and Eisenhower was enthusiastic about covert action. Specifically, he
hoped the CIA could put a stop to Guatemala’s steady leftward drift since the 1950 elec
tion of former army colonel Jacobo Arbenz, who sought to reform the country’s unequal
socioeconomic structure and counted on the close counsel of local Communist Party lead
ers and organized labor. In the wake of a Communist-drafted land reform bill that expro
priated the properties of the Boston-based United Fruit Company and simultaneously
threatened to expand trade unionism to the countryside, US policymakers labored to de
pict Guatemala as a Soviet beachhead in Central America. Washington’s resolve further
stiffened in the wake of a Guatemalan congressional moment of silence to honor Stalin’s
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death in 1953, followed by Arbenz’s decision the following year to respond to a cutoff of
US military aid by purchasing weapons from Czechoslovakia. Despite Guatemala’s des
perate pleas for support against US intervention, not a single Latin American country
rose up to defend Arbenz, much less did the Soviet bloc provide assistance. Prague’s
weapons were provided on a cash-and-carry basis, and Western Hemisphere nations
(even the nationalist government in Bolivia) lined up behind a US-sponsored OAS resolu
tion in March 1954 that condemned “International Communism in the American Re
publics.”2
A few weeks later, the CIA operation codenamed PBSUCCESS commenced. Coupling ex
tensive psychological operations with a less-impressive paramilitary effort led by
Guatemalan exiles entering from neighboring countries, PBSUCCESS convinced Arbenz’s
military that the US would likely intervene if the rebels were defeated. Giving up almost
without a fight, the Guatemalan army demanded that Arbenz leave the country, leading to
a series of military caretakers, each one vetoed by local US diplomats until Washington’s
chosen savior, rebel leader Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, was anointed Guatemala’s new
leader. Citing Moscow’s 1948 orchestration of a Communist coup in Prague, US officials
characterized its actions as a “Czechoslovakia in reverse.”3 Shots had now been fired in
Latin America’s Cold War, and the United States had emerged as the clear victor of its in
augural battle.
With the exception of Washington’s destruction of the Guatemalan revolution, the 1950s
were not a period of high bipolar tension in the Western Hemisphere. Instead, the decade
is best described as a time of rising dissatisfaction among Latin American rulers, who fre
quently complained about what they perceived to be a lack of US interest in regional eco
nomic development, particularly when compared with Washington’s extensive Marshall
Plan aid to Western Europe during the immediate postwar period. The Eisenhower admin
istration attempted to lessen the negative perceptions of its policy as one of “trade not
aid” through targeted programs of elevated assistance, half of which went to (in declining
order of per capita magnitude) nationalist Bolivia, post-coup Guatemala, and develop
ment-oriented Brazil. In order to justify these programs, Eisenhower’s secretary of state
warned the business-friendly Treasury Department of the Communist threat, predicting,
“It might be good banking to put South America through the wringer, but it will come out
red.”4
Nonetheless, little goodwill emerged from such limited country-by-country programs of
economic aid, largely because of Eisenhower’s cozy relationship with dictators such as
Nicaragua’s Somoza family, Venezuela’s Marcos Pérez Jiménez, and Cuba’s Batista. The
latter two were overthrown in 1958 and 1959, respectively, leading to explosions of antiUS sentiment in both countries. Vice President Richard Nixon’s 1958 trip to the region re
sulted in extensive anti-US rioting, especially in Caracas, where crowds attacked and
nearly overturned Nixon’s car. Meanwhile in Cuba, after three years of fighting from their
base in the Sierra Maestra mountains, rebels led by Fidel Castro rode victoriously into
Havana on January 1, 1959. These events in Venezuela and Cuba prompted the Eisenhow
er administration to finally endorse Brazilian president Juscelino Kubitschek’s proposal
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for regional aid, called “Operation Pan America,” leading to the creation of the Social
Progress Trust Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank in 1960.
Initially enjoying tepid support from some US liberals, Cuba’s new revolutionary govern
ment soon fell out of favor with Washington. Following a wave of expropriations of US in
vestment property and Castro’s demand for a reduction in Washington’s embassy staff in
Havana, Eisenhower broke relations in January 1961 and set CIA coup plans in motion. As
the new decade began, Cuba’s emergence as the self-declared “Free Territory of the
Americas” began to inspire the forging of a more radical Latin American anti-imperialist
politics, building on decades’ worth of deep-seated dissatisfaction with US foreign policy.
Coupled with the rise of a Third World bloc set between and against the bipolar stale
mate, these trends held great importance for the evolution of the Cold War in Latin Amer
ica, a region that had long been officially aligned with the United States.5

The Alliance for Progress
Coming in the wake of near-total dissolution of Western European empires in Africa and
Asia, the inauguration of President John Kennedy (1961–1963) took place at a turning
point in the Cold War. Explicitly embracing a role in shaping the trajectories of the newly
independent nations of the Third World, Kennedy offered implicit links between the Glob
al South’s new politics of nonalignment and Latin America’s overriding demands for
greater levels of economic justice. In concrete terms, Kennedy’s Third Worldism relied on
anti-Communist ideologies of socioeconomic modernization that justified a massive in
crease of US foreign aid spending in the Southern Hemisphere, including a buffet of new
or rebranded programs addressing all aspects of counterinsurgency: the Peace Corps, the
US Agency for International Development (USAID), the US Army Green Berets, and
USAID’s Office of Public Safety.
In Latin America economic programs took the form of the Alliance for Progress, launched
in March 1961. It promised $10 billion over ten years (with another $10 billion predicted
from US private investment) in exchange for redistributive social efforts such as land and
tax reform. Consciously aimed at supporting Latin America’s weak non-Communist Left,
Kennedy’s Alliance also provided a fig leaf for extensive programs of covert action and
psychological warfare, including CIA operations to influence elections in Chile, coup plan
ning in Brazil, police repression in Mexico, and union-busting in Bolivia. As Kennedy put
it shortly after his inauguration, his response to growing Latin American leftism was to di
vide the region’s possibilities into three categories: (1) non-Communist modernizing
regimes, (2) anti-Communist dictatorships, and (3) Castro-style radical governments.
Kennedy stated, “We ought to aim at the first, but we really can’t renounce the second
until we are sure that we can avoid the third.”6
The less well-known examples of Kennedy’s quiet expansion of covert action occurred
alongside his administration’s infamous crusade against Cuba, which began with the
CIA’s disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 and persisted with Operation Mon
goose, an extensive program of sabotage and assassination plots against Castro that con
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tinued in some form through 1963. Cuba was also the site of the only direct US-Soviet
showdown of the Cold War, which occurred when Moscow installed nuclear missiles (in
part to protect the island from US attacks) and then precipitously pulled them out in the
face of the Kennedy administration’s threats of war. Castro’s anger at not having been
consulted prior to Moscow’s capitulation sparked tensions between Havana and Moscow,
catalyzing a renewed Cuban commitment to foreign policy independence and to a multi
plying cadre of armed revolutionaries fighting pro-US regimes elsewhere in Latin Ameri
ca.
By the time of Kennedy’s death in November 1963, his success at inoculating the region
against the effects of the Cuban revolution had largely failed to build a viable non-Com
munist Left. Although funding from the Alliance for Progress had catalyzed a modest in
crease in Latin American economic growth, its interventionism had encouraged a polar
ization of the region’s response to Cuba and a resulting deterioration in political stability.
During this period, the Cuba issue prompted several coups and attempted coups:
Argentina’s reformist president, Arturo Frondizi, fell to conservative military officers in
1962, the Peruvian military blocked Kennedy’s favorite non-Communist revolutionary, Víc
tor Haya de la Torre, from taking office after winning democratic elections in the same
year, and left-leaning and right-leaning nationalist leaders were on the ropes in Brazil and
Bolivia, respectively. In an era of abiding Latin American interest in Third World nonalign
ment and a declared tolerance for it in Washington and Moscow, Latin America’s neutral
ist center seemed to be disappearing. Kennedy’s assassination, by a former marine with a
large Federal Bureau of Investigation file and a loose set of obscure contacts in both the
anti- and pro-Castro Cuban exile communities, brought to a close the tensest, but not yet
bloodiest, period of Latin America’s Cold War.
Soon after taking office unexpectedly, President Lyndon Johnson (1963–1969) complained
that his predecessor had been “operating a damned Murder Inc. in the Caribbean.” In
stead, Johnson aimed to reduce the ideological fever pitch.7 Appointing realist Thomas
Mann as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, Johnson seemed to signal that
the United States had no more patience for progressive crusading and that Washington’s
approach to the Third World would again favor political stability and transactional, highly
conditioned aid agreements. Regarding the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, John
son complained that the region’s elites had moved slowly on redistributive reforms, vent
ing privately, “I’ll be damned if I’m going to have it said of me that I was just a numbskull
here for four years, and pissed off this money and got nothing in return, because my
momma didn’t raise me that way!”8 His administration’s abandonment of its
predecessor’s flighty rhetoric of modernization resulted in bitterness among Latin Ameri
can elites, particularly those in the embattled nationalist center, a development that fur
ther polarized the region’s politics.
The one area of continuity between Kennedy and Johnson came in the form of counterin
surgency policy. Within two years of taking office the Johnson administration was scram
bling to support Latin American security forces as they struggled to put down guerrilla
outbreaks and uprisings in nearly every country in the region, resulting in a negotiated
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settlement in Panama, military coups in Brazil and Bolivia, and a US military invasion of
the Dominican Republic. From the perspective of the revolutionaries, 1965 seemed to
represent a renewed US offensive to bring anti-imperialist forces to heel, and not just in
Latin America. Johnson’s April decision to send US marines to Santo Domingo should be
considered alongside his February move to increase US military forces in Vietnam, as
well as his authorization a few months earlier of CIA-funded white mercenaries sent to
quell the Simba rebellion in eastern Congo, where Argentine revolutionary Ernesto “Che”
Guevara headed a Cuban mission in support of the rebels.
Guevara’s presence in Congo reflected Cuba’s growing contextualization of the anti-US
struggle as a global phenomenon, as well as its concern regarding the Johnson
administration’s new wave of tricontinental interventionism in Latin America, Africa, and
Asia. In January 1966, Fidel Castro convoked the Tricontinental Conference in Havana,
which brought together armed liberation movements from across the Global South and
gave birth to the Organización de Solidaridad con los Pueblos de Asia, África, y América
Latina (Organization of Solidarity with the People of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, or
OSPAAAL). Guevara, then hiding out in Tanzania and awaiting his next mission, was the
Tricontinental’s honorary chairman, delivering a speech in absentia that declared Cuba’s
message to the world: “[Latin] America, a forgotten continent in the last liberation strug
gles, which is now beginning to make itself heard through the Tricontinental in the voice
of the vanguard of its peoples, the Cuban revolution, has before it a task of much greater
relevance: to create a second or a third Vietnam.”9 Within a few months, Guevara had
convinced Castro to permit him to lead a new internationalist contingent, this time to the
middle of South America, that is, Bolivia. As in the heart of Africa, CIA-trained forces de
feated the rebels, but this time Guevara did not escape. In October 1967, the best-known
revolutionary of Latin America’s Cold War was executed by Bolivian soldiers in the pres
ence of a CIA officer.

The Rise and Fall of Détente
Despite US officials’ crowing that the death of Che Guevara provided evidence that
Washington’s “preventative medicine” of indirect counterinsurgency training was work
ing, the late 1960s witnessed the rapid growth of anti-imperialist sentiment in Latin
America.10 Shortly after Johnson announced that he would not seek reelection in 1968, a
military coup in Peru brought to power General Juan Velasco Alvarado, who promptly na
tionalized the oil holdings of US investors and opened diplomatic and military relations
with the Soviet bloc. This was followed in 1969 by left-leaning military coups in Panama
and Bolivia and in 1970 by the election of socialist Salvador Allende in Chile and national
ist Luis Echeverría in Mexico. All of these events fueled rising ideological interest in antiimperialism, including a new wave of Third World nonalignment that consequently cat
alyzed a rapid thaw in regional relations with Cuba.
Inaugurated in early 1969, President Richard Nixon (1969–1974) vowed to reduce the
causes of anti-US sentiment in Latin America by forswearing interventionism and deem
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phasizing the “paternalism inherent” in US aid programs and tutelage.11 Reflecting the
realpolitik approach of his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, White House aides
discussed the possibility of publicly abrogating Washington’s rhetorical adhesion to the
Monroe Doctrine, a source of much anti-imperialist scorn, and thus offering formal coun
tenance to Latin American countries’ growing interest in diplomatic and economic con
tact with the East.12
In the early 1970s even conservative governments in Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela
capitalized on this opening, with the last-named playing a major role in assertive Third
World declarations of sovereignty over raw materials. By the time the Nonaligned Move
ment (NAM) held its 1970 and 1973 meetings in Lusaka and Algiers, respectively, 11
Latin American countries had attended at least one NAM gathering: Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In
1974 Mexico led Third World support for a resolution calling for a “New International
Economic Order” at the United Nations General Assembly, and Washington was forced to
concede to overwhelming regional sentiment in favor of an end to OAS sanctions on Cu
ba. Even Brazil’s military rulers had begun to embark on a more independent foreign poli
cy through economic entreaties to the Soviet bloc and diplomatic outreach to Marxist lib
eration movements in Portuguese Africa. Meanwhile, the previously archconservative
Catholic hierarchy was invoking the Third World spirit in the early 1970s, embracing a
new brand of left-wing liberation theology prompted in part by the 1968 declaration of
the Latin American Bishops Conference that “the principle guilt for economic dependence
in our countries rests with . . . economic dictatorship and the ‘international imperialism of
money.’”13
On one hand, Latin America’s rising identification with Third World anti-imperialism over
lapped with major diplomatic shifts in the global Cold War, including the flowering of US
rapprochement with China and a lessening of tensions between Washington and Moscow.
On the other, it soon became clear that East-West détente could just as easily catalyze re
newed Cold War tensions in the Global South. The Nixon administration’s patience wore
particularly thin in regard to Bolivia and Chile, where widespread nationalizations of for
eign investments provoked the ire of conservatives in Congress and among members of
the US business community. Taking a page from the playbook of its predecessors, the
Nixon White House approved covert CIA operations that led to the fall of both left-wing
governments, in 1971 and 1973, respectively, signaling to Latin America that
Washington’s intolerance for socialism was far from over, notwithstanding US-Soviet dé
tente.
After Nixon’s resignation due to an illegal break-in at the Democratic Party headquarters
in the Watergate Hotel, President Gerald Ford (1974–1977) struggled in vain to avoid a
return to high Cold War, which was becoming increasingly likely in the wake of indirect
Cuban and Soviet victories in Angola and in the Horn of Africa, followed shortly there
after by a fresh explosion of bipolar tensions in Central America. In the Southern Cone, a
new wave of military dictators began to worry about what they interpreted as the Nixon
and Ford administrations’ naïve outreach to the East and their apparent inaction with re
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gard to rising transnational cooperation between rural and urban guerrilla movements in
Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. Prompted in part by Washington’s
new preference for indirect leadership in the Third World, known as the Nixon Doctrine
for its encouragement of anti-Communist repression by local leaders in Vietnam, Iran,
and elsewhere, South America’s military leaders joined forces in a collaborative approach
to counterinsurgency known as Operation Condor, which terrorized left-wing political
movements throughout the mid-to-late 1970s. Facilitated in part through relationships
forged at the US Army School of the Americas in Panama, Operation Condor’s master
minds initially received enthusiastic support from the Nixon and Ford administrations.
They soon faced criticism from their superpower patron, however, whose liberal congres
sional majorities and incoming Democratic leadership increasingly began to embrace the
global discourse of human rights.
More than any other postwar US leader, President Jimmy Carter (1977–1981) seemed to
embody the overlapping spirits of détente and Third World nonalignment. Shortly after
his inauguration he vowed that the United States would never return to its previous “inor
dinate fear of communism,” and he announced plans to transfer full sovereignty of the US
military’s Panama Canal Zone to its host country. Carter also pledged his administration
to the pursuit of human rights as a guiding foreign policy principle, and for the first time
since the dawn of the Cold War, Washington began to adopt systematic policies to reduce
political repression by anti-Communist dictatorships, leading to the curtailment of mili
tary aid to conservative allies, particularly in the Southern Cone and Central America.
While a handful of right-wing governments took reformist steps in order to accede to
Carter’s push for human rights, Nicaraguan strongman Antastasio Somoza moved in the
opposite direction as his regime sought to liquidate a growing uprising by the Frente San
dinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front, or FSLN). Despite
having received more than a decade’s worth of tactical support from Castro’s Cuba, the
FSLN (named for the early 20th-century anti-imperialist guerrilla leader Augusto Sandi
no) boasted support from a broad anti-authoritarian coalition. White House pressure on
human rights did Somoza no favors, and Carter’s attempt to broker a peace deal came to
naught. Now uncertain of US military backing, which was briefly frozen in late 1978, So
moza was forced to flee a few months later, resulting in the first successful Latin Ameri
can revolution in nearly twenty years.
Carter administration diplomacy failed to stem the Sandinista government’s leftward drift
toward the Soviet Union and especially Cuba, where the Third World NAM meeting of
1979 included formerly compliant Central American republics such as Nicaragua, Costa
Rica, and El Salvador. Suddenly adopting aggressive Cold War rhetoric unknown since
the early 1960s, the Carter administration authorized an uptick in military aid to the
right-wing dictatorship in Honduras, from which Nicaraguan exiles were in the process of
launching a counterrevolutionary war that would soon engulf the entire region in cycles
of bloodshed. By the last year of his administration, Carter’s equivocal diplomatic ap
proaches to the issues of human rights and relations with the Soviet Union had also con
tributed to US embarrassments in Iran and Afghanistan.
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Washington responded to the latter by boycotting the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games and
supporting the creation of an Islamic anti-Communist guerrilla force similar to the one
that was ramping up operations against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Mean
while, Carter’s earlier negotiation of an end to US sovereignty over the Panama Canal
Zone had done little to endear him to a rising chorus of neoconservative hawks at home,
whose hopes now rested on a charismatic former actor from California who promised a
return to US foreign policy greatness, including steps to reassert Washington’s global
leadership and offer concrete support to anti-Communist “freedom fighters” struggling to
roll back Marxist gains of the late 1970s in southern Africa, the greater Middle East, and
Central America.

The Second Cold War and Closure
Using the boldest Cold Warrior language of any candidate in twenty years, President
Ronald Reagan (1981–1989) campaigned on a platform of rolling back Communism
throughout the world. Excoriating his predecessor for having abandoned Washington’s
authoritarian allies in Latin America and the greater Middle East, Reagan also criticized
the outgoing administration for not doing enough to support anti-Communist “freedom
fighters” in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua. In a controversial move, he selected as
his ambassador to the United Nations the Georgetown law professor Jeanne Kirkpatrick,
well known for her strident defense of anti-Communist strongmen in the Global South.
According to Kirkpatrick, most of these allies permitted some level of free enterprise,
leading her to conclude that their supposed authoritarianism contained within it the pos
sibility of evolution toward liberal capitalism and democracy. Anti-Communist dictator
ships should not be confused, therefore, with Communist “totalitarianism,” which re
quired aggressive antagonism if the United States were to win the last round of the Cold
War.
Reagan’s embrace of the Kirkpatrick Doctrine, as this set of ideas came to be known, cat
alyzed a thaw in relations with apartheid South Africa, in addition to sharp increases in
military aid to dictatorships in Central America and throughout the Southern Cone.
Meanwhile, the Reagan administration continued to employ its predecessor’s foreign poli
cy discourse of human rights, now used as a diplomatic bludgeon exclusively against the
Soviet Union and its allies throughout the world.
Reagan’s pledge of rollback manifested itself most dramatically in Grenada and
Nicaragua. In 1983 the former found itself subject to the Western Hemisphere’s second
outright US military invasion of the Cold War when its progressive government moved
closer to Cuba and the Soviet bloc. Meanwhile, in Nicaragua, covert CIA support for the
Contras ran up against legislative opposition with the passage of the Boland amend
ments, which prohibited covert action aimed at overthrowing the Sandinista government.
The Reagan administration attempted to circumvent Congress’s financial restrictions by
redirecting a portion of the proceeds from a secret arms deal with Iran, resulting in the
largest presidential scandal since Watergate. Indictments were handed down for more
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than a dozen administration officials, resulting in 11 convictions; all had their sentences
commuted or were pardoned in subsequent years. Meanwhile, the administration contin
ued to find ways to scuttle Central American peace negotiations by securing aid to the
Nicaraguan rebels through friendly dictatorships elsewhere in the region.
In other parts of Latin America the human rights explosion of the late 1970s showed no
signs of abating. Despite benefiting from a lifeline with the election of Reagan in 1980,
dictatorships in Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile finally responded to civil unrest by
orchestrating democratic transitions in 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1988, respectively, usher
ing in a new period of guided electoral democracy. Foreshadowing how the United States
would approach post-Communist states in Eastern Europe, the Reagan administration it
self warmed to the Southern Cone’s democratic transitions, which often were accompa
nied by loan conditions that facilitated the entry of international financial institutions to
restructure their economies via austerity, mass privatization, and free market reforms.
During the subsequent decade, this collection of policies would become known as the
“Washington Consensus,” leading to a lost decade of economic decline with Latin Ameri
ca representing a laboratory for future US leadership elsewhere.
With US-Soviet negotiations of the late 1980s leading Moscow to abandon its clients in
the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere in the Third World, the Cold War essentially con
cluded as a global bipolar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Elected in 1988 to channel global change toward a “New World Order,” President George
H. W. Bush (1989–1993) took full advantage of the unipolar moment to manage the peace
ful decline of Moscow’s superpower status. Returning to a prewar approach to US hemi
spheric tutelage, in early 1990 Bush ordered the invasion and overthrow of Panama’s
right-wing dictatorship, which had grown increasingly independent as the Cold War
wound down, and ousted Iraqi forces from Kuwait a year later. These operations roundly
demonstrated Washington’s unrivaled global power. Nicaragua’s Sandinistas, now cut off
from Soviet support, agreed in 1990 to submit to free elections, which they lost by four
teen percentage points. With Moscow’s leadership declaring a year later that it would no
longer hold onto even its European client states by force, the Soviet house of cards col
lapsed, leaving Communist parties in control of only a handful of governments, all far
from Europe. Washington’s hostility toward Communist holdouts such as Cuba continued,
now justified through US triumphalism rather than perceptions of vulnerability to threat.
For some, the end of the Cold War era meant the “End of History.”14 Yet Latin America’s
struggle for diplomatic and economic independence, which predated the US-Soviet con
flict, continues right up to the present day.

Discussion of the Literature
Notwithstanding dated defenses of US foreign policy in Latin America and its latter-day
apologists, historical literature on the United States and the Cold War in Latin America
has a reputation for shrill denunciations of the United States. Many scholars have ap
proached the study of US anti-Communism by focusing on concepts of neocolonialism,
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drawing on either 1960s economic dependency theory or a later emphasis on
Washington’s strategic goal of securing the Western Hemisphere against extracontinental
political influence. Still somewhat hobbled by a “historiographical Monroe Doctrine,”
scholarship concerning Latin America’s Cold War appears to be embarking on a healthy
period of internationalization, with recent works focusing on the agency of local, regional,
and transnational actors, including a renewed emphasis on anti-imperialist trends that
transcend the narrow chronological period of US-Soviet competition.15
One of the earliest apologies of US foreign policy in Latin America was written prior to
the Cold War by a founding father of US diplomatic history, Samuel Flagg Bemis. Roundly
criticized by subsequent revisionist scholars, Bemis’s work nonetheless provides an in
triguing foundation for more recent interest in the ideological and cultural motivations
undergirding US foreign policy throughout the world.16 In the 1950s William Appleman
Williams issued the most thorough rejection of Bemis’s work by an early application of
the economic roots of Washington’s “imperial anticolonialism,” which first targeted the
American republics in the late 19th century.17 Williams’s approach served as a catalyst for
a fresh wave of critical scholarship about US foreign policy in Latin America, represented
most ably by his former doctoral student Walter Lafeber.18
In the 1980s, a trend away from economics led historians to explore the political strate
gies employed by US foreign policymakers to contain Communism in Latin America. Still
reliant almost exclusively on US documentation, chiefly that of the White House’s presi
dential library system and State Department records at the National Archives and
Records Administration, post-revisionist scholarship incorporated a renewed interest in
contextualizing Washington’s long-standing fear of extra-continental powers, thus inter
preting the Cold War as a particularly aggressive iteration of the 19th century Monroe
Doctrine.19
A three-pronged debate has emerged within the subfield of US foreign relations with Cold
War Latin America. On the revisionist side of the conversation lies Greg Grandin, whose
celebrated work draws mostly on Latin American sources to reveal what he argues is
Washington’s allergy to progressive change. According to Grandin, historians’ denuncia
tions of US imperialism concerning the region are fully justified, since “Latin America in
particular has long been the Achilles’ heel in the hard armor of US virtue.”20 As a kind of
mirror image to this approach, Stephen Rabe draws similar conclusions in his scholarship
regarding the strategic motivations of US foreign policy. As Rabe puts it, Washington’s
obsessive fear of foreign Communist threats led a series of US presidential administra
tions to “compromise, even mutilate those grand goals for the Western Hemisphere” that
often decorate official pronouncements.21 The third approach to the issue emerged with
the 2012 publication of Hal Brands’s Latin America’s Cold War. Somewhat ironically rely
ing chiefly on Latin American sources, à la Grandin, Brands downplays US agency in an
attempt to shift blame for the region’s Cold War bloodshed to regional anti-Communist
elites.22 In a more eclectic study drawing on a combination of US and Latin American
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sources, Piero Gleijeses leans toward Rabe’s argument while offering some backing for
Brands’s condemnation of Latin American oligarchs.23
Moving beyond the question of blame, recent work has begun to embrace the cultural and
transnational turns informing scholarship across the discipline of history. Drawing on
Emily Rosenberg’s Spreading the American Dream (1982), which fleshed out some of the
underexplored cultural analysis within Williams’s earlier work, US diplomatic historians
have increasingly narrated the Cold War experiences of local and nonstate actors, includ
ing multinational corporations, humanitarian activists, and trade unionists.24
Concurrently, growth of scholarly interest regarding the Cold War in the Global South has
led to calls for greater appreciation of Latin America’s Third World experience. Still in its
infancy, this emerging scholarship incorporates economic explanations, while also explor
ing the region’s concrete diplomatic and political engagement beyond the Western Hemi
sphere.25
One of the greatest challenges in the study of Latin America’s Cold War is to ensure more
cross-pollination between Latin American studies, US foreign relations historiography,
and wider trends in international and transnational history. If these literatures continue in
dialogue in the coming years, scholars may well become less concerned with condemning
particular historical actors for bad foreign policy outcomes, with the result that a new
generation of scholars will break new ground for constructing theories that better explain
the myriad of methods and motivations behind US relations with the countries of Latin
America.

Primary Sources
The US presidential libraries are the best sources of primary documentation on
Washington’s foreign policy toward Latin America during the Cold War period. Most illu
minating and accessible are the country-specific “National Security Files,” which com
prise extensive records created by the White House National Security Council during
each administration. These contain copies of the most important cables to and from US
embassies in the region, many intelligence memoranda and reports, and a wealth of cor
respondence between the White House, the State Department, the Defense Department,
and the CIA. The presidential libraries also contain personal papers left behind by protag
onists close to elite US policymaking and implementation. Best of all, presidential li
braries are well-staffed with competent archivists who facilitate researchers’ expedited
declassification requests under a mandatory review process created through a series of
executive orders since the 1970s.
For those wishing to engage a broader range of documentation, the State Department
files (Record Group 59) at the National Archives and Records Administration are also or
ganized by country. Easiest to access are the Secretary of State’s Central Files, contain
ing official correspondence within Foggy Bottom in addition to a near-complete set of offi
cial cable traffic with the embassies. The State Department Lot Files provide an even
deeper look into the workings of the department, particularly at the level of the office of
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the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America. These collections contain official and
unofficial correspondence within each country desk (as well as between the desks and the
embassies), including draft cables and long-form letters that did not receive the signature
stamp of the Secretary of State.
For researchers unable to travel to physical repositories, the State Department has digi
tized its entire collection of vaunted red books, Foreign Relations of the United States,
which provide a carefully curated selection of country-by-country diplomatic records.
More recently declassified documents can be accessed through George Washington
University’s Digital National Security Archive, as well as easily searchable Freedom of In
formation Act online reading rooms, set up by both the State Department and the Central
Intelligence Agency. In addition, research attention to US foreign relations has increas
ingly begun to employ transnational methods by mining the documentary collections of
nonstate actors such as multinational corporations, humanitarian organizations, and
trade unions. These sources are as varied as were the many historical players in nonstate
US foreign relations with Latin America.
In Latin America, archival collections have undergone rapid improvement since 2007,
thanks in part to the investment of €200,000 by the Mexican government through the Or
ganization of Ibero-American States for the purpose of “contributing to the exchange of
information and promoting cooperation between the diplomatic archives of the foreign re
lations ministries” of each of the twenty participating countries.26 Research spaces have
been opened or expanded in Bolivia, Cuba, and Mexico, with additional improvements
made in public access to historical diplomatic records in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru,
and many others. As in the United States, Latin American foreign ministry archives are
typically organized on a country-by-country basis, with classification categories ranging
between ordinario (unclassified), reservado (confidential), secreto (secret), and alto secre
to (top secret). At present, Cuba provides researchers with access only to documentation
marked “ordinario,” and Chile continues its blanket restriction on country files for neigh
boring Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru, while otherwise permitting access to documentation
at all classification levels.
The most open foreign ministry archive in Latin America is likely the one in Brazil, which
is divided between Rio de Janeiro for pre-1959 documentation and Brasilia for records
created thereafter. Brazil’s aggressive declassification law provides access to nearly all
records from the country’s military dictatorship (1964–1985), including full researcher
access to Brazilian military and national security files, which are generally very difficult
to access elsewhere in Latin America. Argentina’s similar declassification law applies on
ly to the last period of military dictatorship, between 1976 and 1983.
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